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I offer a new reconstruction of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s idealism. Kant held that we
impose categorial form on experience, while sensation provides its matter. Hegel argues
that  the  matter  we  receive cannot  guide  our  imposition of  form on it.  Contra  recent
interpretations,  Hegel’s  argument  does  not  depend  on  a  conceptualist  account  of
perception or a view of the categories as empirically conditioned. His objection is that
given Kant’s dualistic metaphysics, the categories cannot have material conditions for
correct application. This leads to subjectivism in the content of experience: the subject is
given an implausibly strong role in determining what is the case. Hegel’s own absolute
idealism solves this problem.
1 Introduction
Kant described his philosophy as formal idealism (B159n).1 He held that both the
subject and external reality contribute to experience. We give experience its form: its
ordering in space and time and under the categories. By producing in us a manifold of
sensation, external reality provides experience with its matter. Formal idealism thus uses
the distinction between form and matter to give both idealism and realism their due. 
In his 1802 essay  Faith and Knowledge [Glauben und Wissen], Hegel wrote of
Kant’s view (78): ‘A formal idealism which in this way sets an absolute Ego-point and
its intellect on one side, and an absolute manifold, or sensation, on the other side, is a
dualism.’2 Hegel held that the relation between the categories and the matter of intuition
was  unintelligible  in  formal  idealism.  Too  much  of  experience  is  imposed  by  the
subject, leading to ‘subjectivism’ or ‘psychological idealism’.
While it is often noted that Hegel rejects Kant’s central use of the form-matter
distinction – namely, the distinction between concepts and intuitions – Hegel’s argument
for this position remains obscure. This is largely because the mature Hegel was content
to state his objections in summary fashion, without detailed engagement with Kant’s
texts.3 Hegel’s detailed argument occurs in early texts like FK and the Differenzschrift
(DFS), which have received much less philosophical attention. The present paper aims
to fill this gap.
1 Citations to the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) give page numbers from the 1781 A-edition and the
1787 B-edition and quote from the Guyer-Wood translation. Citations to the Critique of the Power of
Judgment (CPJ) and other works by Kant are to the Academy edition of Kant’s works.
2 Citations to Faith and Knowledge (FK) and The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems
of Philosophy (DFS) give page numbers to the English translations by Cerf and Harris. Citations to
the Encyclopedia Logic (EL) give page numbers to the English translation by Geraets, Suchting and
Harris.
3 What discussion there is – in the Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity in the Encyclopedia Logic
and the beginning of the Logic of the Concept in the  Science of Logic – is less thorough, perhaps
because it treats Kant’s theory as a superseded stage in the history of philosophy rather than as a live
possibility.
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My reading of the argument against Kant in FK differs from the two major extant
readings, by Robert  Pippin and Sally Sedgwick. Unlike these authors, I do not take
Hegel’s argument to turn on a conceptualist  account of perception or  a view of the
categories  as  empirically  conditioned.  Rather,  Hegel  aims  to  show  that  Kant’s
metaphysics leads to a problem in his theory of cognition. In particular, Kant’s dualistic
treatment of the subject and external reality has the consequence that the categories lack
application-conditions which are responsive to the features of the manifold to which
they are applied – in short, material conditions for correct application. On my reading of
the argument, absolute idealism is a natural response. 
After briefly sketching some Kantian doctrines (2), I state the central problem (3),
contrasting my view with those of Pippin and Sedgwick. I  then (4),  (5) reconstruct
Hegel’s argument against Kant in FK. Finally, (6) I assess two lines of response and (7)
explain how absolute idealism solves the problem.
There are two points I should make at the outset. First, this is early Hegel. Faith
and  Knowledge predates  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit and  the  logico-metaphysical
system set out in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia. While I will point out some
continuities in what follows, the positive views Hegel held in 1802 should not simply be
imputed to his later self.  Second, and despite the first point, there is no reason why
Hegel should have abandoned the negative side of his early critique as he developed his
system.4 The argument I draw from FK aims to show that Kant’s account fails even by
its  own lights.  It  remains  of  interest  in  assessing  the  prospects  not  only  of  Kant’s
particular  variety  of  formal  idealism but  of  other  attempts  to  follow the  same path
between idealism and realism.5
2 Kant: apperception and the manifold
To make sense of Hegel’s argument we need some basic Kantian doctrines in
view.6 For  Kant,  cognition  requires  bringing  together  two  sorts  of  representations:
concepts  and  intuitions  (A50/B74).  These  arise  from  distinct  faculties.  Concepts
originate in the understanding’s spontaneous activity, while intuitions are (in beings like
us) receptive,  the product  of sensibility.  Concepts and intuitions come together  in  a
process of progressive applications of form to matter. Sensations are ordered in space
and time into intuitions; intuitions are bound together by the categories into cognitions;
and cognitions are unified, incompletely, by reason’s search for fundamental laws of
nature.
Sensation, ‘the matter of sensible cognition’ (A50/B74), is the ‘effect of an object
on  the  capacity  for  representation’  (A20/B34).  External  reality  impinges  on  our
sensibility and produces sensations; these sensations are then arranged in space and
4 As Longuenesse (1998, ch. 6) shows, much of Hegel’s discussion of Kant in FK anticipates arguments
that resurface in his mature work.
5 For a contemporary version of formal idealism see Hofweber (2017a and 2017b).
6 All  of  these  doctrines  are  the subject  of  voluminous scholarly  debate.  In  this  section I  focus  on
relatively uncontroversial basics in the main text and flag interpretive issues in the footnotes. 
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time, the forms of sensibility, giving rise to empirical intuition.7 Intuitions are singular
representations (Allais 2015, 147). All sensations are ordered in time, the form of inner
sense, while some sensations are also ordered in space, the form of outer sense. We also
have pure or ‘formal’ intuitions, which are free from sensation and are of space and time
alone. 
Kant  often  refers  to  intuition  as  a  manifold,  which  suggests  a  collection  of
unconnected impressions.8 In particular, we cannot receive in intuition a representation
of a complex as complex:
[T]he combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form
of sensible intuition. [...] we can represent nothing as combined in the object
without having previously combined it ourselves [...] among all representations
combination is the only one that is not given through objects. (B130)
This  spells  out  the  sense  in  which  sensibility  gives  us  a  manifold:  it  is  a  set  of
categorially unconnected representations which has to be ‘gone through, taken up, and
combined’ (A77/B102) by the activity of the understanding. Call the view that we do
not receive categorial form in intuition ‘perceptual atomism’.9 
Concepts are general representations; they have a unifying function. This is bound
up with their nature as exercises of spontaneity: the unity of a concept is the unity of an
act. Kant tells us that ‘concepts [rest] on functions. By a function, however, I understand
the  unity  of  the  action  of  ordering  different  representations  under  a  common  one.
Concepts  are  therefore  grounded  on  the  spontaneity  of  thinking’ (A68/B93).  Like
intuitions,  concepts  are  empirical  or  pure.  Empirical  concepts  such  as  ‘red’  are
abstracted from experience. Pure concepts or ‘categories’ are not: they are imposed by
the subject. These categories – which include unity, reality, substance, causation and
possibility  –  provide  the  basic  framework  for  experience  of  an  objective  world
(Strawson 1990, Part II, ch. II). 
7 I  use  the  phrase  ‘external  reality’ to  refer  not  to  appearances  but  to  their  supersensible  grounds
(A537/B565).  As  Kant  later  wrote,  the  CPR ‘posits  this  ground  of  the  matter  of  sensory
representations not once again in things, as objects of the senses, but in something super-sensible,
which grounds the latter, and of which we can have no cognition’ (On a discovery whereby any new
critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by an older one, Ak 8:215). Some would deny that
sensations have any such ground (Allison 2004; Bird 2006a), but this view faces serious objections
(Kanterian 2013, 278ff; Beiser 2002, ch. 5). I remain noncommittal on how exactly this grounding
occurs: cf. Stang (2015). 
8 Kant’s claim that sensations are ‘ordered in certain relations’ (A20/B34) seems to suggest that the
manifold is ordered in space and time in virtue of sensibility alone, but this is disputed.  This is the
focus of the debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist readings of Kant (see e.g. McLear
2015; Allais 2015; Longuenesse 2007). Hegel’s argument is independent of this issue.
9 Förster argues that Kant takes perceptual atomism to follow from the fact that sensibility is passively
receptive  (2012, 28n).  For  further  discussion  see  Pippin  (1982,  ch.  2),  Stern  (1990,  ch.  1)  and
Sedgwick (1996, 571ff), who refers to a related ‘no-unity-in-content principle’. 
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The basic principle  of our spontaneity,  in  its  theoretical aspect,  is  the original
synthetic unity of apperception (B134n). It tells us that for any representations P and Q,
if they are my representations then I must be able to say ‘I think P’ and ‘I think Q’; and
for this to be possible, I must be able to combine them in one unified experience, to ‘call
them all together  my representations, which constitute  one’ (B135; cf. Messina 2014,
12). The basic ways that we combine representations are the categories (B144). Unity
under the categories is,  in turn,  what  gives our representations relation to an object
(B137).
The  act  of  ‘putting  different  representations  together’ under  the  categories  is
called  synthesis  (A77/B103).  In  Kitcher’s  words,  the  function  of  synthesis  is  to
‘construct unified representations’ out of the unconnected manifold which we receive
through the senses (1994, 81). Kant tells us that the a priori synthesis which unifies the
manifold is carried out by the imagination, referring to it as the ‘productive synthesis of
the imagination’ (A118) or the ‘transcendental synthesis  of the imagination’ (B151).
This  synthesis  in  turn  makes  possible  the  (correct  or  incorrect)  application  of  the
categories  in  empirical  judgment. Finally,  reason  seeks  further  unity  by  binding
cognitions together under higher and higher laws of nature (A644/B672).
Kant’s idealism is built around this account of cognition. I said above that the
account can be seen as a a process of progressive applications of form to matter. Form
and  matter,  for  Kant,  have  different  metaphysical  origins:  the  basic  matter  of
experience, sensation, results from affection by an external reality, while all the varieties
of form – space and time, the categories, and the Ideas of reason (A645/B673) – are the
contribution of the transcendental subject. The reason why we cannot apprehend things
as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us, is that our cognition depends on
sensible intuition. Our experience is spatiotemporal because our forms of sensibility are
space and time; nothing in external reality requires precisely these forms, and Kant is
clear that, for all we know, other creatures could have other forms (B150). In this sense
the things we cognize are merely ‘ideal’.
3 The guidance problem
In this section I will sketch the problem animating Hegel’s arguments in FK and
contrast my interpretation with those of Pippin and Sedgwick.10
Hegel argues that there is no way of making sense of how the categories and the
manifold of intuition come to bear on each other.11 Kant’s theory requires the manifold
to play a role in determining the content of experience, while also being formed by
10 I comment on the views of other interpreters in footnotes throughout the paper. Further discussion of
FK can be found in Görland (1966) and Horstmann (1991).
11 Here and throughout I refer to categories, not empirical concepts, because Hegel’s concern is only
with the former. Kant’s distinction between empirical concepts and categories may parallel the one
Hegel draws in EI 51ff. between ‘representations’, which have empirical content, and ‘thoughts’/‘the
concept’, which do not (see Inwood (1983), pp. 10-13, and for an opposed reading of ‘the concept’,
McDowell (2009, 86).)
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spontaneity.  But  the  categories  and  the  manifold  are  conceived  of  as  alien  to  one
another, such that the manifold cannot play this role. That this is Hegel’s worry can be
seen in passages like the following:
Identity of this formal kind finds itself immediately confronted by or next to an
infinite  non-identity,  with  which  it  must  coalesce  in  some incomprehensible
way. On one side there is the Ego [...] with its synthetic unity which, taken thus
in isolation, is formal unity of the manifold. But next to it there is an infinity of
sensations... (FK 76)
That is, the pure concepts of the understanding have to unify the products of sensibility,
but precisely because the two factors are so different, there is no intelligible explanation
of  how they jointly  give  rise  to  the  content  of  experience.  And if  the  manifold  of
intuition cannot play a role in determining the content of experience, then that content is
determined only by the subject  –  a  position Hegel  calls  ‘psychological  idealism’ or
subjectivism. Let me explain.
In a priori  synthesis  we combine (or ‘synthesize’)  the manifold of intuition in
accord with the categories. For short, say that we combine the representations by giving
them ‘categorial form’. Here is a simplified example to illustrate the principle.12 Say I
am given a series of representations – P,  Q, R, S – in intuition. I combine them as
follows: P and Q are representations of a single object, as are R and S. The object P + Q
is causing some effect in the object R + S. All the representations thus form part of a
single  unified  experience.  Synthesizing  the  representations  in  this  way  means  that
certain things are true: namely, that there are these two objects in the world, with this
causal relationship.
Now, it is implicit in Kant’s account that there must be multiple logically possible
ways of combining the deliverances of sensibility. (It might be logically possible, say, to
combine the given representations as being of three objects, P, Q + R and S.) For to hold
that there is only one logically possible way of synthesizing a manifold would be, in
effect,  to  hold  that  subjects  receive  the  manifold  as  already  categorially  unified,
contrary to perceptual atomism. This fact leads to the requirement which drives Hegel’s
argument, which Pippin has called the ‘guidedness of empirical knowledge’ (1982, 46),
and which I will refer to as guidance.13 Guidance comprises two conditions.
First: among the possible ways of combining the manifold in a priori synthesis,
some  must  be  correct,  while  the  others  are  incorrect,  in  virtue  of  features  of  the
manifold which hold independently of how it is in fact combined. If this were not so,
what  is  true  and false,  and which  objects  existed  within  experience,  would  depend
solely on my spontaneity. The range of possible combinations – i.e. possible facts –
12 This example is meant to illustrate the job that a priori synthesis has to do. It is not meant to suggest
that, prior to being combined under the categories, our representations already have content, or even
that sensations are given in a determinate temporal order prior to synthesis.
13 I am not claiming that Kant accepted the requirement of guidance, but that this requirement follows
from the structure of formal idealism, whether Kant wished to accept it or not. 
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would still depend on the manifold, but the choice among these possible facts would be
made by spontaneity. This is subjectivism.
Second: whatever features of the manifold make some way or ways of combining
it  correct  also  explain  why  I  combine  the  manifold  correctly  in  a  priori  synthesis.
Rejecting this condition leads to incoherence: while there would be standards for the
correctness of combinations of the manifold, those standards would not play any role in
explaining why experience turns out to be combined in a correct rather than incorrect
way.14
Let us return to the simplified example to see what this entails. There must be
something in the manifold of P, Q, R, S that justifies and explains the subject’s act of
combining them as of P + Q and R + S, and no similar justification for combining them
in at  least  some other  ways.  Recall,  however,  that  combination  cannot  be  given in
intuition: the manifold does not contain the relation P + Q. Nor can it contain some
other relation between P and Q, say P * Q, to guide our synthesizing activity. For if the
*-relation means that the subject must unify the relata into P + Q, then it amounts to
receiving a representation of combination in intuition.
If the manifold is to justify and explain our combining it in some ways and not
others, then, there must be something about P and Q which makes them well-suited for
being combined, in a way that Q and R are not. In particular, it must be the case that the
category under which P and Q are combined is associated with an application-condition
which is  satisfied by P and Q,  but not  satisfied by Q and R. This  is  where Kant’s
dualism of subject and external reality becomes problematic. Given this dualism, Hegel
will argue, it is not clear how elements of the manifold can have features capable of
guiding  the  categories;  equivalently,  it  is  not  clear  how  the  categories  can  have
application-conditions  responsive  to  any  features  of  the  manifold,  that  is,  material
conditions of correct application.15 
Let me briefly comment on how my account differs from recent interpretations by
Pippin and Sedgwick.16 Pippin (2005, 26) identifies the concept-intuition theory as the
target of Hegel’s critique, but emphasizes that ‘what Hegel is out to criticize is not the
distinction itself, but the way Kant understands the nature of concept-intuition unity in
knowledge claims.’ While  Hegel  agrees  that  knowledge involves  both  concepts  and
intuitions, ‘he is objecting to a “mechanical” opposition in favor of an “organic” role for
the imagination in understanding the relation between intuition and concept’ (28). But
what does it mean for the relation between category and intuition to be ‘organic’ rather
14 Kantians may argue that  it  makes no sense to speak of ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ applications of the
categories, as the categories are preconditions for the distinction between true and false judgments
(A62-63/B87-88). I respond in section 6.2 below. 
15 The problem is stated by Wretzel (2018, 3) in the course of addressing a different aspect of Hegel’s
response, namely his use of the concept of organism.
16 Westphal (1996; 2000, 292) takes Hegel’s objection in FK to target the ‘transcendental affinity of the
manifold’, i.e. the fact that the manifold of sensation displays sufficient order to be capable of being
organized  by  the  categories.  While  there  is  a  genuine  issue  about  how  Kant  can  account  for
transcendental affinity, a solution to this issue would leave the guidance problem untouched. 
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than ‘mechanical’? For Pippin, to treat the relation as mechanical is to treat the relata as
separable; to treat the relation as organic is to treat them as inseparable.  On Pippin’s
reading,  then,  Hegel’s critique of Kant prefigures recent  arguments  by conceptualist
theorists  of  perception  against  nonconceptualist  theorists  (Pippin  1989,  28-31).  The
solution is to adopt the conceptualist view that the manifold is ‘already conceptually
articulated’ (Pippin 2005, 34; see also Schulting 2016; Wretzel 2018).
On  my  view,  Hegel’s  objection  does  not  depend  on  whether  Kant  was  a
conceptualist  or  a  nonconceptualist.  The  deep dualism in  Kant  is  not  the  epistemic
distinction between categories and intuitions, but the metaphysical distinction between
the subject and external reality.17 Insofar as both conceptualists and nonconceptualists
are committed to this metaphysical picture, they both fall within the scope of Hegel’s
argument. In particular, as I will argue below, a conceptualist account of the manifold of
intuition is subject to Hegel’s critique insofar as the categorial form of the manifold fails
to be determined by features of external reality. The solution to the problem, therefore,
is not to modify Kant’s epistemology; it is to modify Kant’s metaphysics.  While Pippin
is  rightly  concerned  to  avoid  interpreting  Hegel’s  theory  as  a  sort  of  pre-Critical
atavism,  Hegel’s  critique  has  a  more  significant  metaphysical  dimension  than  is
apparent in his reading.18
Sedgwick (2012) also reads Hegel as objecting to the concept-intuition theory.
She  observes  that  Hegel  is  not  calling  into  question  Kant’s  ‘insistence  that  our
discursive form of understanding must rely on sensible intuitions as well as concepts’
(2012, 57);  he is  not proposing to collapse intuitions into concepts or concepts into
intuitions.  Rather,  Hegel  questions what  Sedgwick  calls  the  ‘heterogeneity’  or
‘externality’ of  concept  to  intuition.  This  externality  has  two  aspects  (87):  (i)  that
‘concepts are not already given with the a posteriori matter of empirical intuition but
must be contributed by us’ and (ii) that ‘the conceptual form we contribute cannot be
known  to  reflect  the  nature  of  the  given  content  itself’ (118).  Together,  Sedgwick
argues, these claims, which Kant inherits from empiricism (1996, 571; 2012, 89), lead
him to  subjectivism.  In  my  view,  while  Sedgwick’s  interpretation  comes  close  to
articulating Hegel’s objection, the exact nature of the problem remains unclear in her
account. 
The claim (i) that for Kant, concepts are contributed by the subject, rather than
given  with  the  matter  of  intuition,  is  correct  if  we  take  ‘concepts’ to  mean  pure
concepts. But this claim is a pillar of Kant’s theory of cognition and not something that
ought  to worry a Kantian.  The core of the problem must therefore be (ii):  that  the
17 So Houlgate (2015) is right that Hegel’s basic problem with Kant is that Kant accepts an opposition
between the  subjective  and  the  objective.  However,  on Houlgate’s  reading  of  Hegel’s  Logic,  the
complaint  is  that  the  opposition  is  uncritically  presupposed.  Ameriks  (2015)  casts  doubt  on  this
accusation. On my reading of FK the complaint is that the opposition is false.
18 The metaphysical dimension of Hegel’s account is recognized in Pippin’s more recent work (2018,
chapter 2). The present paper does not seek to resolve the long-running debate between traditional
(metaphysical)  and nontraditional  (deflationist)  interpretations of  Hegel  (see  Kreines  2006;  2015;
Brandom 2019), but only to get a plausible metaphysical reading of FK on the table.
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conceptual form the subject contributes cannot be known to reflect the nature of the
given content.19 But it is not wholly clear what it means for form to reflect the nature of
content, why it fails to do so in Kant’s theory, or how this leads to subjectivism. 
One thing this might mean is that the activity of giving form to the manifold gives
us knowledge about the manifold or about the manifold’s cause. For example, if I sort a
pile of chess pieces into black and white, this form-giving activity reflects the nature of
the content; if I sort them into two groups by whim, this  reflects nothing about the
content. If that is right, then, for form to reflect the nature of content, the content must
be such that it determines, for a given form, whether the form is being applied correctly,
and explains why the form is being applied correctly. In my terms, the matter has to be
able to guide the application of form.
If this is the right reading of Sedgwick, then we agree on the core problem about
form and matter;. However, we differ on the root of the problem and on Hegel’s solution
to it. On my reading, the root of the problem is that the subject is too isolated from the
manifold; the solution,  as I  will  show, is  a prior unity of subject  and manifold.  On
Sedgwick’s view, the problematic gap between form and content in Kant is a result of
‘the assumption that reason ... is a transcendent power’ (2012, 95), in other words ‘that
some of our ideas or concepts are formed in complete abstraction from any input from
the  realm of  the  empirical’ (97).  The  solution  is  to  recognize  that  all  concepts  are
historically  and empirically  conditioned,  such that  critique,  in  the  Kantian  sense,  is
impossible: ‘it is not possible for us to abstract to a meta-level form of inquiry that in no
way reflects our debt to the ordinary as well as scientific practices of our day’ (159).20 
I have two concerns about this reading. First, insofar as Hegel treats the categories
as empirically conditioned, he is left without an answer to the question (how is synthetic
a  priori  knowledge  possible?)  which  motivated  Kant’s  anti-empiricism  about  the
categories in the first place. Second, the idea that Hegel rejects such meta-level inquiry
is in some tension with the project of the Logic, which seems to acknowledge no debt to
history, empirical knowledge or everyday practices of inquiry.  These concerns are of
course not enough to justify rejecting Sedgwick’s account, but are perhaps enough to
justify considering another. 
4 Absolute antithesis: Hegel’s criticism of Kant
In this section I begin my interpretation of Hegel’s criticism of Kant in FK. 
Hegel  criticizes  Kant  for  setting  up ‘an absolute  antithesis’ (FK 78):  both the
manifold of intuition and the categories are in different ways abstract and indeterminate.
The manifold is difference without unity; the categories, or the ‘abstract Ego’ (71), are
unity without difference, ‘empty identity’. Underlying Hegel’s concern is the principle
that for a representation to have determinate content it must have both form and matter.
19 Sedgwick writes that this assumption is, in Hegel’s view, ‘responsible for the skepticism of Kant’s
philosophy’ (2012, 89).
20 See also McDowell (2009a, 86-88).  
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As Inwood (1992, 110) writes, ‘Pure, contentless form and pure, formless matter are, on
Hegel’s view, the same: a wholly indeterminate abstraction.’ For Kant,  however, the
basic factors of experience are exactly these: the categories, which are purely formal,
and the manifold, which is solely material. The indeterminacy of the two sides is what
leads  to  the  problem about  their  relation.  I  will  begin  with  the  manifold  and  then
consider the categories.
4.1 The manifold
Hegel  sees  the  manifold  of  intuition  as  an  ‘infinite  non-identity’ (FK  76),  a
collection of categorially unconnected atoms. It appears, he writes, that ‘the manifold of
sensibility,  empirical  consciousness  as  intuition and sensation,  is  in  itself  something
unintegrated, that the world is in itself falling to pieces’ (74). But it is not clear that
Hegel wholly disagrees with this picture. In  EL, he describes the sensory in atomistic
terms: the representations we receive in sensation and intuition ‘constitute a manifold in
terms of their content, but equally by virtue of their form, i.e. by virtue of the status of
being outside one another as is characteristic of sensoriness’ (EL 85). So while Hegel
sees this conception of intuition as one that Kant takes over from empiricism, he does
not  reject  all  features  of  it.21 He agrees  that  the categories  are  not  contained in  the
sensory manifold; this reflects the superiority of reason over the senses: ‘one does not
hear the universal and one does not see it; instead, it is only for the spirit’ (EL 56). The
problem is not that the manifold ought to itself contain categorial form, but that it is not
able to constrain our application of the categories.
The manifold as we receive it lacks categorial form, or what Hegel calls ‘objective
determinateness’ (FK 74-75).22 This means that the manifold is indeterminate: ‘once it is
abandoned by the categories, this realm cannot be anything but a formless lump’ (76).
The elements of the manifold are disconnected from one another. It contains difference
or matter. But there are no relations between the elements, so there is no unity or form.
In intuition alone there is ‘no relative identity of unity and difference’ (70). It follows
that the manifold lacks determinate content. 
But isn’t this exactly Kant’s point, when he says that intuitions without concepts
are blind (A51/B75), that on their own they lack relation to an object? If this is all Hegel
means, then he hasn’t disagreed with Kant. In fact, Hegel means something stronger:
the manifold is indeterminate with regard to the categories in that it cannot guide our
application of categories to it. There are many ways the manifold could be bound into
objects; these various ways form a space of possibilities; and the manifold does not
exclude any of these ways as being incorrect. 
To properly evaluate this criticism we need to consider the categories. Before this,
21 See Sedgwick (2012, 90ff.) and Houlgate (2018, ss. 5.1 and 5.2) for discussion. 
22 This  reading  of  ‘objective  determinateness’  is  based  on  the  following:  ‘...without  any  further
categorial determinateness in either case. Objective determinateness and its forms first come in...’ (75)
Hegel  means  ‘objective’ in  the  sense  of  the  unification  of  representations  around  objects.  This
explains how the objective determinateness of the manifold can be ‘subjective’ (77). 
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I want to raise an objection to Hegel’s account. Hegel seems to assimilate intuition to
sensation. He talks of ‘intuition and sensation’ or ‘feeling and intuition’ in the same
terms, characterizing both as indeterminate. A Kantian might object that while sensation
is  genuinely  formless,  Kant  does  not  claim that  it  has  representational  content  –  it
merely provides the material for intuition. By contrast, in intuition the sensory matter is
ordered in space and time. This ordering, some Kantians may add, is not due to the
subject’s synthetic activity, but is simply given in virtue of our forms of sensibility. The
manifold of intuition is therefore not indeterminate. 
There are two ways Hegel might respond. First, he might offer a ‘conceptualist’
reading of Kant, that is,  deny that the manifold can have even spatiotemporal unity
without  prior  synthesis  by  the  subject.23 It  seems  that  Hegel  does  read  Kant  (in
particular, the B160 footnote) this way: ‘the original synthetic unity of apperception is
recognized also as the principle of the figurative synthesis, i.e. of the forms of intuition;
space and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity [...] is
conceived as the principle of the very sensibility which was previously characterized
only  as  receptivity’  (FK  69-70).  Such  a  reading  supports  the  claim  that  before
spontaneity does its work, the manifold is formless.
But, second, Hegel does not need to make this claim here.24 A better response, for
present purposes, is that the Kantian’s objection misses the point. Hegel is concerned
about  the manifold’s lack of  categorial  form. This  is  consistent  with the manifold’s
having some non-categorial form. Such a form is only relevant insofar as it can guide
the application of the categories: the Kantian would need to claim that, prior to any
synthesis, we receive intuitions of unified things moving through space, etc.  Such a
reading  is  possible  (Allais  2015,  chs.  7,  11).  But  it  is  in  serious  tension  with  the
perceptual atomist claim that we cannot receive representations of complexes as such in
intuition. If the Kantian doesn’t want to take such a strongly non-conceptualist position,
then the spatiotemporal form of intuition is not guiding the categories. Then, for Hegel,
the difference between intuitions and sensations doesn’t matter: they are both formless
with respect to the categories.25
4.2 The categories
Hegel’s portrayal of the categories mirrors his depiction of the manifold. If the
manifold is difference without unity, then the categories are unity without difference:
like the manifold, but for the opposite reason, they are abstract and indeterminate. 
23 For a  reading  of  Hegel  along these lines,  see  Pippin (1989,  chs.  2  and 4;  2005) and McDowell
(2009a).
24 Also, Hegel  appears  to allow for  non-categorial  form elsewhere (EL 51):  ‘whatever is  sensory is
outside of something else, the abstract forms of which are, more precisely, those of being side-by-side
and after one another [i.e. space and time]’. For further objections to McDowell’s treatment of Hegel
as a conceptualist, see Houlgate, (2018, s. 5.5), and see also Sedgwick (1993, 280), addressing similar
claims by Pippin.
25 I will qualify this response in section 5 below, where I consider the Schematism.
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Before looking at Hegel’s view, there are a few things to note. First, Hegel’s target
varies.  In  different  places  in  FK he  criticizes  the  Ego,  the  I,  the  unity  of  self-
consciousness, the concept and the understanding, all in basically the same terms. This
sliding  is,  however,  justified,  as  the  targets  are  closely  related:  the  I  or  Ego is  the
unifying subject of experience; the understanding is the faculty of concepts; the pure
concepts are the form of the understanding and the basic modes by which the I unifies
representations.  Here  I  will  focus  on  the  I  and  the  categories.  Second,  Hegel
distinguishes ‘what Kant calls the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception
from the Ego which does the representing and is the subject – the Ego which, as Kant
says,  merely accompanies  all  representations’ (FK  73).  This  distinction between the
abstract Ego and the original synthetic unity of apperception is part of Hegel’s general
strategy in  FK of  defending the good Kant against  the bad one.  It  is  often unclear
whether Hegel is offering his own views or articulating the ‘speculative’ ideas that he
thinks  Kant  was  grasping  at.  For  clarity,  I  will  not  assess  whether   the  distinction
between the Ego and the original synthetic unity of apperception can be made out.26 But
the distinction is helpful to keep in mind in reading Hegel’s discussion. 
Hegel refers to the I as ‘empty identity’ (71) or ‘pure unity’ (73). In other places it
is ‘an absolute Ego-point and its intellect’ (78) or ‘the absolute abstract unity’ (85). But
what is objectionable about this? Sedgwick (2012, 139) suggests the following: ‘[a]s
independent from common reality, our concepts are taken to owe nothing of their nature
and origin to objects known, to the process of knowing, to the relation of the knower to
what is known. [...] [S]uch concepts or categories are brought to experience by thinking
and knowing subjects.’ This may be taken to suggest that Hegel holds, unlike Kant, that
our categories are derived from sense-experience, not solely from the understanding. I
don’t think this can be right as a reading of Hegel. It is reminiscent of the empiricism
Hegel consistently rejects, and it calls into question our ability to have synthetic a priori
knowledge. This view could also be undermined by the kinds of arguments Kant makes
for the a priori status of space (A24/B39). Like space, the categories cannot be derived
from experience of objects, because they are preconditions for such experience. 
A better reading is that guidance requires an affinity between concepts and the
manifold they organize. ‘In isolation the pure concept is the empty identity. It is only as
being relatively identical with that which it stands against, that it is concept; and it is
plenished only through the manifold of intuition’ (FK 70). A pure concept in isolation
from the manifold it organizes lacks determinate content. But this sounds again like a
conclusion Kant would accept – after all, concepts without intuitions are empty. Kant
agrees that in some sense the categories lack content, and that they therefore need to be
spelled out, or schematized, in terms of sensible objects (B149; A140/B179). If Hegel
thinks he is making an objection against Kant, then, he must mean something stronger.
Perhaps this.  It  is unclear how the categories can have  material conditions for their
correct application. Hegel’s objection here deals with the same problem as his objection
to the manifold, but from the opposite direction. The problem with the manifold is that,
26 See also Sedgwick (2012, ch. 4) and Schulting (2005, 177ff.; 2017, ch. 8, s. 8.4).
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if it is formless, it’s not clear how it can guide category-application. The problem with
the categories is that it’s not clear how they can relate to the matter of intuition, such
that it can constrain their use. 
It is easy to see how empirical concepts can have sensory conditions for right or
wrong application. If we learn the concept ‘red’ by having red things pointed out to us,
then the look of red things can partly  constitute  the concept.  Then whether ‘red’ is
correctly  applied to  X can depend on X’s similarity  to  paradigmatic  red things.  By
contrast, it’s harder to see how pure concepts, which are not derived from experience,
can have such conditions. But if they don’t have such conditions, it’s not clear how the
manifold can guide the way we apply them.
This interpretation explains why Hegel directs his ire so often at the ‘abstract Ego’
rather than the categories themselves. The I or Ego is the source of the categories, and
its metaphysical independence from the external reality that grounds sensation is what
gives rise to the problem about how intuition can guide the categories. This point also
clarifies the place of Hegel’s critique in early German idealism. If Kant’s attempt to
justify pure knowledge was vitiated by his dualistic conception of subject and reality,
then it makes sense that post-Kantian idealists like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel would
replace this  dualism with a single principle from which both subject and reality are
meant to derive.27 While there is disagreement about the nature of the principle and the
details of the derivation from it, it  is common ground that there must be some such
principle if we are to avoid Kant’s error. I will return to this below. 
The place where Kant tries to solve the problem is the Schematism (B177/A138):
‘how is the  subsumption of [intuitions] under [categories], thus the  application of the
category  to  appearances  possible,  since  no  one  would  say  that  the  category,  e.g.,
causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance?’
Hegel sees the Schematism’s importance and agrees that the imagination is crucial here.
Why, then, does he think that Kant failed to solve the problem?
5 Formal identity: the role of the Schematism
In this section I set out the role of the Schematism in addressing the guidance
problem and explain why, for Hegel, this solution is unsatisfactory. Before considering
the Schematism, however, let’s take stock. So far, there is an ‘absolute Ego-point and its
intellect on one side, and an absolute manifold, or sensation, on the other side’ (FK 78).
Both sides are indeterminate. The manifold does not come to us as categorially unified;
its points do not determine the way they should be connected up in synthesis. The I is
independent of the manifold, such that its pure concepts have no necessary reference to
27 As Ng writes (2020, 69): philosophers of reflection such as Kant ‘construct their philosophies based
on an assumed dualism and opposition between, roughly, mind and world (subject and object), and the
distinct  causal  orders  that  each  represents.  This  fixed  opposition  is  never  given  independent
justification and, moreover, results in a situation where these dualisms lead to skeptical or dogmatic
conclusions  concerning  the  possibility  of  their  nonetheless  necessary  reconciliation,  where  the
impossibility of reconciliation would amount to the impossibility of knowledge.’
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the manifold’s points, as they would if they were empirically derived; it is therefore not
clear how the manifold can determine the correct application of the concepts. Hegel
now argues that, because of this problem, the two sides cannot come together in the
right way. The relation between the I and the manifold is ‘formal identity’ rather than
‘absolute identity’ (see Harris 1983, 45). By this Hegel means that the categories can
intelligibly relate to the form of intuition, but not to its matter, sensation.28 
Kant holds that transcendental logic is able to specify application-conditions for
the categories a priori (A135/B174-5). For each category, there is a corresponding time-
determination or ‘schema’ which provides a criterion for the application of the category
to intuition. Schemas allow the temporal form of the manifold to guide the application
of the categories. As Bell (1987) has argued, the Schematism does not posit additional
rules to govern concept-application,  but rather involves  an aesthetic response to  the
manifold of the sort that Kant describes in the  CPJ; in Kant’s words, a schema is in
between a concept and an image (A141/B180).
I can now state Hegel’s objection to the Schematism. The schemas give conditions
for category-application in terms of the form of inner sense,  time; they do not give
conditions for category-application in terms of the matter, sensation. Aesthetic response
is to ‘either  shape or  play’ (CPJ s. 14, Ak 5:225). But the temporal relations between
empirical intuitions do not exhaust the differences in matter between them. There are
similarities  and  differences  among  sensations  which  are  not  reflected  in  time-
determinations.29 Indeed,  since  time is  something we contribute,  it  is  not  clear  that
temporal relations reflect any differences in what causes our sensations.30 It follows that
if  our  spontaneity  is  guided  only  by  time-determinations,  the  sensory  matter  is  not
playing a role in guiding the synthesis: ‘the heterogeneity of appearance has here been
left out’ (FK 76). Next to the ‘formal unity of the manifold’, i.e. the formal aspects of
the manifold, which have an intelligible relation (‘formal identity’) with the categories,
there is an ‘infinity of sensations’ which is not doing any work.
But sensation is what we ultimately receive from external reality – from affection
by things  in  themselves.  In this  way sensation is  transcendentally  objective.  ‘[T]hat
which corresponds to the sensation in [objects  as appearances] is  the transcendental
matter of all objects, as things in themselves’ (A143/B182). So if the sensory matter of
intuition  is  not  guiding  our  application  of  the  categories,  it  looks  like  the  way we
categorize the manifold is not constrained by what we receive from outside, but is up to
us. It seems that categorial form is subjective:
28 This  is  the  problem  Bowman  refers  to  as  as  ‘the  sensible  manifold  as  the  material  factor  in
determining objective reality’ (2015, 210). Cf. the Remark to s. 135 of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:
‘only a formal identity whose nature it is to exclude all content’. 
29 It  is  true that  the schema for ‘reality’ involves ‘that to which a sensation in general  corresponds’
(A143/B182). It also involves the degree or intensity of the sensation. But this still misses the material
differences among sensations. As Kant wrote in his copy of the CPR, ‘Sensation therefore lies outside
all a priori cognition’ (note d at A143/B182).
30 A Kantian could claim that temporal relations map exactly onto some non-temporal pattern in the
things in themselves, but Kant does not, and for good reason: this would undermine the ideality of
time (McDowell 2009, 79). 
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[T]hat  the  manifold  of  sensibility,  empirical  consciousness  as  intuition  and
sensation,  is itself  something unintegrated,  that the world is in itself  falling to
pieces, and only gets objective coherence and support, substantiality, multiplicity,
even  actuality  and  possibility,  through  the  good  offices  of  human  self-
consciousness and intellect. (FK 74)
In fact, experience does have determinate content. If Kant is correct, this content arises
from the coming-together of the categories and the manifold. But the way the manifold
is synthesized depends not on the matter, but only on what we contribute by ordering
the sensations in time and then applying the categories in virtue of time-relations: ‘the
thing  in  itself  becomes  object  insofar  as  it  obtains  from  the  active  subject  some
determination which for this reason alone is one and the same in both of them’ (FK 75).
The form we contribute does not reflect the matter we receive. This form, however,
determines which objects we experience and what causal relations they stand in – that
is, it determines, to a large extent, what is true and false. In this way idealisms which
settle  for  formal  identity  between  I  and  manifold  are  ‘forever  sliding  into  [...]
psychological idealism’ (76).31
6 Two Kantian responses
In this section I consider two Kantian responses to Hegel’s criticism. 
6.1 The metaphysical response
Hegel’s criticism depends on the claim that the manifold is too indeterminate to
constrain  our  application  of  the categories  to  it,  but  this  is  to  take the  manifold in
isolation from its source in things in themselves.  Things in themselves are perfectly
determinate. The Kantian should not claim, here, that things in themselves fall under the
categories, but rather that things in themselves have determinations isomorphic to the
categorial  features  of  appearances.32 For  any  fact  about  appearance  X’s  being  a
substance (etc.), there is a corresponding fact about some set of things in themselves –
31 This is why even a conceptualist reading of Kant (on which the synthesis of the manifold of intuition
depends on the contribution of pure concepts) is subject to Hegel’s critique. The question is whether
the categorial  form of the manifold is  guided by what  the subject  receives  from external  reality,
namely sensation. Given Kant’s dualism of subject and external reality, there is no explanation of how
this guidance could occur – how the categories could have material conditions of correct application.
Whether the organization of sensation under the categories occurs at the stage of synthesis or at the
stage of judgment makes no difference. As Sedgwick writes, Hegel “thinks the key to collapsing [the
concept-intuition] dichotomy lies,  not in challenging the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic,
but  in  developing  Kant’s  conception  of  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception”  (1993,  276,
emphasis added). 
32 Pippin refers to this as the idea that the manifold has properties ‘analogous’ to those of experienced
objects (1982, 49). 
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call  them X’s  ‘supersensible  ground’.  The determinacy of  the  supersensible  ground
finds expression in the manifold and guides the application of the categories.
Hegel  anticipates  this  thought:  ‘the  incomprehensible  determinateness  of  the
empirical consciousness comes altogether from the things in themselves’ (FK 74). He
responds that the realm of things in themselves, because it falls outside the categories,
must be a ‘formless lump’:
Objectivity and stability derive solely from the categories; the realm of things in
themselves is without categories [...]. The only idea we can form of this realm is
like  that  of  the  iron  king  in  the  fairy  tale  whom a  human  self-consciousness
permeates with the veins of objectivity so that he can stand erect. But then formal
transcendental idealism sucks these veins out of the king so that the upright shape
collapses and becomes something in between form and lump, repulsive to look at.
(FK 77)
In  other  words,  the  realm of  things  in  themselves  is  indeterminate.  It  is  not  clear,
however, that Hegel is entitled to this claim. A Kantian can maintain that, as things in
themselves are beyond our knowledge, we have no justification for deciding one way or
the other whether they are determinate.33
But this response may not solve the problem. As long as we do not know that
things in themselves are determinate, then we do not know that synthesis is guided by
anything in the manifold. So subjectivism may, for all we know, be true. In this sense
‘the objectivity of the categories in experience’ is still ‘something contingent’ (FK 77).
Hegel’s objection thus anticipates his later critique of the unconceptualized contingency
that remains in Kant’s account (Ng 2009). Such contingency makes it impossible to
fully  explain how knowledge is  possible,  and thus  leaves  us  exposed to  skepticism
(Bristow 2007, chs. 2 and 3).
Waiving this  issue,  there is  a further  problem with the Kantian response.  It  is
unclear  how  the  (quasi-)categorial  form  of  things  in  themselves  could  guide  our
synthesis.  Hegel’s  discussion  of  the  Schematism shows that,  while  the  form of  the
manifold can guide the application of the categories, its matter cannot play a similar
role.34 And to hold that the form of the manifold reflects information about things in
themselves  would  threaten  the  ideality  of  time.  Even  if  things  in  themselves  are
determinate, unless we can explain how this determinacy is expressed in the manifold in
such a way as to guide synthesis, this determinacy is beside the point. 
We might try to strengthen the Kantian response by characterizing the categories
33 Ameriks makes roughly this move in his defence of Kant against Hegelian critics, taking Kant to
claim (at least prior to the Antinomies) not that the categories do not apply to things in themselves, but
only ‘that a dogmatic assumption that the categories can be known to do more than necessarily make
our experience possible a priori would be mysterious and bring uncertainty’ (2015, 59).
34 This  is  why,  as  I  wrote  above,  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  ‘transcendental  affinity  of  the
manifold’, which Westphal takes to be central to Hegel’s argument in FK, would leave the guidance
problem untouched.
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as ‘response-dependent concepts’. A response-dependent concept is one whose correct
application is defined in terms of the circumstances under which a (well-functioning,
appropriately situated, etc.) subject will apply it. We might say, for example, that ‘red’
applies  to  those  things  which  a  well-functioning  subject,  trained  in  the  use  of  the
concept, will classify as red. Perhaps Kant can hold that while there is no account of
how we  apply  the  categories  to  the  manifold,  we do,  undeniably,  apply  them,  and
(supposing our faculties are working properly) whatever in the manifold inclines us to
apply a given category will count as a correct condition for its application.
I do not think that response-dependent concepts can coherently be invoked here.
As Wright has argued, an account of a concept as response-dependent requires that we
have an independent and non-trivial grasp of the conditions under which the subject’s
response counts as appropriate. These will usually involve conditions of the subject and
of the environment. But a Kantian is in no position to specify such conditions, since we
have no access to our cognitive faculties except through reflection on their activity of
forming experience. We can give no content to the idea of our transcendental faculties
malfunctioning. And we can therefore give no content to the idea that the categories are
correctly  applied  to  whatever  in  the  manifold  induces  their  application  by  a  well-
functioning set of faculties. 
6.2 The epistemological response
Hegel  is  demanding  an  account  of  how  the  manifold  of  intuition  guides  the
application of the categories in synthesis. A Kantian may reject this explanatory demand
on the basis that Hegel is asking about something beyond our cognitive reach.35 The
very point of Kant’s Copernican Revolution (Bxvi) is that we cannot understand a priori
cognition if we assume that cognition must conform to external reality, rather than that
external reality conforms to our cognition. But to ask about guidance just is to ask about
how our cognition conforms to external reality. A variant of this response is that the
guidance problem is  the product  of an incoherent  attempt to  look at  our relation to
reality  from ‘sideways-on’.  In  McDowell’s  words,  ‘pertaining  to  things  as  they  are
given to our senses is as much objectivity as we can intelligibly want’ (2009a, 78). The
fact that we can know things only insofar as they conform to the conditions for our
knowing  them  is  a  truism;  there  is  no  room  for  a  further  account  of  how  those
conditions pertain to reality.
It is at least consistent for a Kantian to refuse to give such an account. The central
result  of the  CPR is  that  synthetic  a  priori  cognition can do nothing more than ‘to
anticipate the form of a possible experience in general’ (A246/B303; cf. B166); in other
words, all we can have a priori is knowledge of the necessary features of appearances.
The account that Hegel is after is clearly synthetic and a priori, but it is not about the
necessary features of appearances. Hegel is asking about the workings of the synthesis
that gives rise to appearances: a process of which we cannot have any intuition, and
35 This is the view of ‘epistemic’ readers of Kant (Allison 2004; Bird 2006b). 
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therefore cannot have cognition. 
However, there are two problems with this response. The first is that rejecting
Hegel’s  explanatory  demand  comes  at  a  significant  cost.  Refusing  to  say  how,  or
whether, synthesis is guided by the manifold means refusing to spell out the sense in
which external reality provides the matter of experience, while the subject contributes
its  form. And this  use of  the  form-matter  contrast  is  essential  to  Kant’s  attempt  to
distance himself from Berkeley. In a letter to J.S. Beck, for example, Kant wrote that an
attempt to assimilate the two ‘does not deserve the slightest attention. For I speak of
ideality  in  reference  to  the  form of  representations;  but  they  interpret  this  to  mean
ideality with respect to the matter...’36 If the claim that the subject contributes only the
form of experience cannot be intelligibly explicated, then neither can Kant’s attempt to
distance himself from Berkeley. In other words, Kant’s dialectical context creates direct
pressure to take the sideways-on view which McDowell would disavow. Kant has to
insist on the formal character of his idealism, but it is not clear that this expression has
any sense in McDowell’s account.
The second problem with the epistemological response becomes clear when we
ask about the status of Kant’s own account, which includes claims about the nature and
sources of sensation, intuition, pure and empirical concepts, and the process by which
these come together. These are not matters of which we have an intuition (Young 1994,
332-3). It seems that there are two possibilities here. One is that Kant’s own account has
the status of cognition. In this case, the account Hegel is seeking would have the same
status as Kant’s own, and would not be beyond our reach. For Hegel is asking about the
relation between intuition and category in synthesis – matters which are at the heart of
Kant’s account in the First Critique. The other possibility is that the account Hegel seeks
could not have the status of cognition. But then it is not clear how Kant’s own theory
can  have  this  status.37 This  is  problematic:  the  fundamental  defect  of  pre-Kantian
metaphysics is meant to be that its claims do not have the status of cognition. These are
well-known problems, and I will not attempt to decide between these options here (see
Moore 2011, ch. 5). The point is that, however the problems are solved, the issues that
Hegel is asking about will have the same epistemic status as core Kantian claims, such
that a Kantian cannot consistently assert the doctrines set out in the CPR while refusing
to address Hegel’s criticism.
7 Absolute identity: Hegel’s alternative
I want to end by commenting on the general conclusions to be drawn from the
above argument, in particular how Hegel’s theory of an ‘original identity’ solves the
36 Letter to J.S. Beck, dated December 4, 1792 [Ak 11:395]. Cf. Kant’s response to the Feder-Garve
review of the CPR in the Appendix to the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics [Ak 4:375] and in
the Discovery [Ak 8:187-251]. 
37 McDowell recognizes this problem in suggesting that Kant’s critical philosophy has to be radicalized
– and was, by Hegel – by abandoning or deflating some of these claims (2009a, 79-81). I return to this
below. 
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problem he identifies in Kant’s account.
7.1 Deflationary and inflationary solutions
Kant attempted a purely formal idealism, on which we are the source of the form
of experience, while things in themselves are the source of its matter, namely sensation.
Such a position was meant to justify our claim to synthetic a priori knowledge while
maintaining a role for external reality. FK aims to show that such a position cannot be
sustained. We cannot make sense of the matter of experience if it is alien to our forms of
cognition, and we cannot make sense of those forms if they lack an inherent connection
to their matter.
These problems may bring to mind Davidson’s (1973) argument against ‘the very
idea of a conceptual scheme’. Davidson argues that we cannot make sense of a dualism
of  scheme  and  content  –  that  is,  of  a  conceptual  scheme  with  which  we  subjects
organize  some  unorganized  content.  He  urges  us  to  simply  think  in  terms  of
‘unmediated  touch  with  the  familiar  objects  whose  antics  make  our  sentences  and
opinions true or false’ (183; cf. Lear 1984, 242). Once conclusion we could draw from
Hegel’s argument,  then,  is  that  we should give up on idealism: forget  the idea that
experience has a form which we bring to it, that this allows us a priori knowledge, that
the form may or may not correspond to reality, etc. On this view we should excise the
parts of Kant which make claims from a transcendental point of view – the ideality of
space and time, the existence of things in themselves, the possibility of other forms of
sensibility.  For  these  are  the  sorts  of  claims  that  lead  to  subjectivism.  This  is  the
conclusion favoured by McDowell and by Sedgwick, who insists that reason cannot
‘transcend  the  realm of  the  empirical’ (2012,  94)  as  Kant  thinks  it  can.38 Both  are
responding to Hegelian concerns.
It is interesting, then, that this is not the conclusion Hegel draws in FK. Instead he
says that – contra Kant – we can have ‘cognition of the Absolute’ (68) and that the key
to this is to recognize the ‘absolute identity of the heterogeneous’ from which ‘the Ego
as thinking subject, and the manifold as body and world first detach themselves’ (71-2).
He thinks  that  Kant  should  have  accepted  absolute  idealism rather  than  the  merely
formal kind. That is, Hegel does not want to discard the idea that the objects of ordinary
experience have a form which we can know about a priori; instead, he says that this
form reflects the nature of the content. Not because we receive categorial form with the
sensory matter, but because one thing, an ‘original identity of opposites’ (60), that is, of
matter and form, gives rise to the sensory manifold and the I with its categories.
In short, Hegel is proposing an inflationary rather than deflationary answer to the
guidance problem: rather than cutting away or reading down some of Kant’s apparent
38 McDowell  suggests  that  Hegelian  idealism  consists  in  discarding  the  ‘frame’ of  transcendental
idealism from Kant and that the movement of the Concept is ‘the evolution of empirical inquiry’
(2009a, 81 and 86). He does accept a weak version of the claim that experience has a form which we
bring to it – namely, that our receptivity involves the exercise of rational capacities (2009b, 257). But
he rejects the further claim that this form is ideal. For further discussion see Haddock (2008). 
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theoretical  commitments  such that  the  problem never  arises,  he  proposes  to  add an
additional commitment  which makes a solution to the problem possible. In the next
section, I consider how to interpret his difficult claims.  Before this,  let me state the
conditions that such an interpretation must meet. First, to solve the guidance problem, it
must  explain  why  the  categories  have  material  conditions  for  correct  application.
Second, to be dialectically apt as a response to Kant, the account must be knowable
within Critical strictures.
7.2 The identity of subject and external reality
Hegel’s positive view in  FK involves an ‘original identity’ between the subject
and external reality. To begin interpreting this claim, it is useful to consider how one
might explain why two things, such as the subject and external reality, share a form. In a
recent  paper,  Thomas  Hofweber  writes  that  there  are  ‘two  straightforward  ways  in
which this correspondence could be explained, based on two different directions of what
is explanatorily more basic’: either external reality imposes a form on the subject, or the
subject imposes a form on external reality (2019, 704). The former mode of explanation
involves  an  empiricist  account  of  concept-acquisition,  while  the  latter  leads  to
subjective idealism. But Hofweber leaves out a third option: a  common cause  of the
subject and external reality, which, being the source of both, explains why they share a
form. The explanatory strategy is familiar: the fact that B and C are both derived from A
can explain why B and C share some feature. 
This  is  the  option  Hegel  takes  up  in  FK.  He  proposes  that  there  is  a  single
principle which is metaphysically prior both to the subject and to the external reality
which is cognized by the subject:  the ‘original identity’ or ‘absolute synthesis’ from
which ‘the Ego as thinking subject, and the manifold as body and world first detach
themselves’ (71-2). He takes this principle to be what Kant calls the ‘original synthetic
unity  of  apperception’,  distinguishing  this  from  the  finite  ‘Ego’ which  ‘does  the
representing and is the subject’ (73).39 Drawing on Schelling, Hegel also refers to this
principle as the  subject-object, giving rise to subjective and objective subject-objects:
‘For absolute identity to be the principle of an entire system it is necessary that  both
subject and object be posited as subject-object’ (DS 155; Ng 2020, 72ff).
The principle is ‘original’ in the sense that it is prior to the subject and external
reality: it ‘must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary,
39 Hegel  also  identifies  it  with  other  Kantian  faculties,  particularly  reason  and  the  productive
imagination (73; Harris 1983, 53-54). Hegel is also drawing on Kant’s conception of the intuitive
understanding in ss. 76-77 of the CPJ: ‘to interpret the transcendental unity of apperception in these
terms is to say that it is the source not only of the form but also of the matter of appearances. It is to
say that it is that unity of an understanding for which there is no distinction between form and matter,
between possible and actual, between concept and intuition, the very understanding which in the third
Critique Kant  characterized  as  intuitive  understanding’ (Longuenesse  2007,  187;  see  also  Förster
2009). In being a whole that is prior to its parts, this principle has something in common with living
organisms as understood both by Kant and by Hegel (Wretzel 2018, 966; Ng 2020, 63), but this is not
to say that it is itself an organism. 
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absolute,  original  identity  of  opposites’ (70);  it  is  not  ‘inserted  between an existing
absolute subject and an absolute existing world’, but is ‘that out of which subjective
Ego and objective world first sunder themselves’ (73). By contrast, in Kant’s account,
the subject and external reality come together in the process of cognition, but there is no
supposition that they have a common origin. The common origin proposed by Hegel
makes possible a solution to the guidance problem, as I will explain. 
First, the reason why our categories can be applied correctly or incorrectly is that
the source of the manifold has a form. There is a right way to reconstruct a shattered pot
because it was whole before it was broken. In the same way, the unity of the principle
from which the manifold is derived explains why there is a correct way of unifying the
manifold under the categories. Second, our categories have material, not merely formal,
conditions of correct application because they are derived from the same source as the
manifold. Such a  connection between a concept and its instances can explain why the
concept’s application-conditions reflect features of the instances: this is, for example,
the idea underlying abstractionist accounts of concept-formation. Here, if the subject
(whose understanding is constituted by these categories) is generated out of an original
identity  of  matter  and  form,  then  this  explains  why  those  subjects  have  material
application-conditions. As a result, both conditions of guidance are satisfied: there are
correct and incorrect ways of combining the manifold,  and whatever features of the
manifold make some ways of combining it correct explain why we combine it correctly
in a priori synthesis. 
Then, when we give form to the matter we receive, this corresponds to the original
form that the matter had. When the subject is affected by external reality, giving rise to
sensations ordered in space and time, this ordering reflects differences in the matter of
intuition;40 when this  manifold  is  synthesized  under  the  schematized  categories,  the
resulting categorial form corresponds to the form which the matter originally had. The
application of the categories to the manifold is understood by Hegel as a return to unity;
in it, ‘knower and known are necessarily one’ (DFS 164). As Hegel writes (EL 87), ‘it is
not the subjective activity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute unity into the
manifoldness. This identity is, rather, the absolute, the true itself. It is, so to speak, the
benevolence of the absolute to release the individualities to their self-enjoyment, and
this absolute drives them back into the absolute unity.’ Hegel suggests that the return to
unity occurs inadequately in intuition (‘in it the identity ... is totally immersed in the
manifold’ (70))  and  more  adequately  in  judgment  (‘the  original  identity  appears  in
consciousness as judgment’ (71)).41 
Is  this  view consistent  with  Critical  strictures  about  the  limits  of  knowledge?
Clearly Hegel’s view requires us to say more than Kant does about the origins of the
subject and of the external reality that gives rise to sensation; his attempts to attribute
40 Hegel can, but need not, accept the conceptualist claim that the categories are already involved at this
stage.
41 It  may be  that  a  fully  adequate  ‘cognition  of  the  Absolute’ requires  not  only  judgment,  but  the
organization of judgments in the systematic form of a science. See Harris (1983, 36) and Longuenesse
(2007, 185). 
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his view to Kant are hard to credit. But if Hegel is right, the existence of the original
identity, and its priority to the subject and external reality, are required if knowledge is
to be possible: a view, like Kant’s, which leaves out the original identity is unable to
explain the return to unity in cognition, finding only formal identity. The existence and
priority of the original identity are, therefore, arrived at by a recognizably Kantian style
of transcendental argument, and are consistent with Critical strictures to the extent that
Kant’s own commitments are.42 They are conditions for the possibility of knowledge; if
we suppose that knowledge is possible, we are required to accept that these conditions
hold. 
Thus, Hegel’s account in FK provides the outline of an alternative to Kant’s view
which solves the guidance problem and which is (insofar as it is required to solve that
problem) not  merely an exercise in pre-Critical  metaphysics.  That  said,  the account
remains merely an outline. Hegel tells us little in  FK about what exactly the original
identity  is, and in what sense it is prior to, or the source of, the subject and external
reality. What is the process by which they come to exist? 
It  is not clear that Hegel  can say more without the significant methodological
developments  of  the  Phenomenology and  the  Logic,  in  particular  the  role  of
contradiction in driving the system forward. But the explanatory structure first set forth
in  FK is  one which will  recur throughout Hegel’s work:  first,  an original,  synthetic
unity; then a breaking-apart into subject and manifold; and third, a return to unity as the
subject cognizes the manifold, guided by its original form. In this sense, the guidance
problem and the explanatory structure  it  requires lead out to Hegel’s mature system
(Longuenesse 2007, 190ff). 
42 Hegel comments that ‘[t]he basic principle ... is completely transcendental’ (DFS). To be clear, my
claim is  that  the  argument  set  out  in  this  paper  is  a  transcendental  one,  not  that  all  of  Hegel’s
arguments are. As I suggest below, while transcendental argument may get us to the existence of the
original identity, it can tell us little about its nature. A reviewer raises the question whether, if the
argument is  transcendental,  it  can tell  us that  the original  identity exists or  only that  we have to
presuppose that it exists (Stroud 1968). While a full discussion is not possible in the scope of this
paper, I take the argument to establish a conditional claim (Franks 2005, 204): if knowledge of an
objective world is possible then the original identity exists. A skeptic should accept this conditional. A
non-skeptic is entitled to detach the consequent. 
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